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Why did the Japanese slowdown of the 90s last so long if none of the shocks that hit the Japanese
economy had a comparable persistence? In this paper, I use the Comin and Gertler (2006) model of
medium term fluctuations to explore whether their endogenous technology mechanisms can amplify
and propagate the wage markup fluctuations observed in Japan over the early 90s to drive a Japanese
productivity slowdown. The model can reproduce the observed decline, relative to trend of R&D expenditures
and the slowdown in the diffusion of new technologies. This slowdown in the development and adoption
of new technologies constitutes a powerful propagation mechanism. As a result, the model does a good
job in reproducing the evolution of output, consumption, investment, TFP and hours worked in Japan
during the "lost decade", specially up to 1998. During the last two years of the decade, the propagation
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1. Introduction
Two striking aspects of the Japanese stagnation of the 1990s are its severity and especially
its persistence. Over the 1983-1991 period, TFP grew at a more than respectable rate
of 2.4 percent. It fell to an average of 0.2 percent for 1991-2000. We know from Cogley
and Nason (1995) that the persistence in real business cycles models comes from the
persistence of the shocks. However, none of the shocks that arguably have hit the Japanese
economy seem to have persisted for a decade. This implies that a successful account of
the Japanese stagnation requires a model where the propagation mechanisms generate a
signi￿cant amount of persistence.
One such approach is to modify a simple real business cycle model to allow for en-
dogenous productivity as in Comin and Gertler (2006). This approach provides a uni￿ed
explanation for the co-movements of TFP, technology di⁄usion and R&D over the short
and medium term. To capture endogenous productivity dynamics, Comin and Gertler
(2006) and use a variation of Romer￿ s (1990) model of R&D expanding the variety of
￿I would like to thank for very helpful comments my dicussant Gialuca Violante, the editors Koichi
Hamada, Anyl Kashyap and David Weinstein and the participants at the ESRI workshop at Columbia
University, and, for assistance, the ESRI. All remaining errors are my own.
1intermediate goods extended to allow for an endogenous rate of adoption of new technolo-
gies. Building on the evidence from Hall (1997) and others, they use (low persistence)
wage markup shocks as source of ￿ uctuations. They show that, a version of the model
calibrated to match the US economy, can closely reproduce US postwar ￿ uctuations in
output, consumption, hours worked, investment, TFP, R&D and the relative price of
capital at the high and medium term frequencies.
In this paper, I use the Comin and Gertler (2006) model to explore whether it can
amplify and propagate the wage markup ￿ uctuations observed in Japan over the 90s to
generate the Japanese productivity slowdown. As in Comin and Gertler (2006), rather
than taking a strong stand in the fundamental nature of the shocks, we take the wage
markup as a reasonable reduced form measure of several shocks that can be represented
as markups.
This paper is inspired by Hayashi and Prescott (2002) who show that a real business
cycle model with TFP shocks can reproduce the Japanese ￿ uctuations over the 1990s
in output, consumption and investment. This implies that standard macro models can
go a long way in explaining why Japan su⁄ered its growth slowdown conditional on the
evolution of TFP. However, technology and TFP are to a large extent endogenous to the
agents decisions. Thus, the follow up question is why Japanese TFP was depressed during
the 90s.
In section 2, I explore in more detail the Japanese performance during the 90s. Two
interesting ￿ndings are that R&D expenditures stopped growing and that the speed of
di⁄usion of new technologies slowed down (to the point that South Korea surpassed Japan
in both the di⁄usion of computers and internet). This suggests that the endogenous
technology mechanisms played a signi￿cant role in the propagation of the shocks that
caused the Japanese slowdown in productivity.
Section 3 describes the model and the intuition of why it generates pro-cyclical and
highly persistent ￿ uctuations in productivity despite the fact that shocks are relatively
transitory. Section 4 presents the impulse responses to a wage markup shock and the
simulations of the Japanese economy once I hit it with the observed series of markup
shocks. The model does a good job in reproducing the evolution of output, consumption,
investment, TFP and hours worked in Japan during the lost decade, specially up to 1998.
During the last two years of the decade, the propagation mechanisms in the model seem
2to run out of steam, while the Japanese economy continued to deteriorate. However, I
think it is fair to say that overall the model provides a powerful propagation mechanism
to the ￿ uctuations in the markups we saw in Japan. Section 5 concludes.
2. Facts
In this section, I present a series of facts with two purposes in mind. First, to describe
the main features of the data that I consider a model of the Japanese slowdown should
account for. Second, to motivate the mechanisms built in in the model.
Figure 1 presents the evolution of GNP per working age person1 detrended with a
linear trend given by the average post-war growth rate of the same variable in the U.S.
which has been approximately 2.4% per year. In this and most of the subsequent ￿gures,
I take 1990 as the base year. This Figure illustrates clearly the magnitude of both the
post-war catch up and the slow down of growth during the 1990s. between 1960 and 1990
per working age person GNP grew at an average rate of 4.6% per year. This rate declined
to 0.7% per year during the lost decade.
Hayashi and Prescott (2002) show that the slowdown in TFP growth (or GNP growth)
during the 1990s was not due to a constraint in investment due to a lack of capital to
￿nance pro￿table investment projects. In particular, they show that there was no decline
during the 1990s in investment by non-￿nancial corporations as a share of GDP. The
collapsed in the banking system, however, forced ￿rms to ￿nd other sources of funds
di⁄erent from the bank loans that had helped ￿nance 52% of the investment by non-
￿nancial corporations during the 80s. These were a higher corporate savings rate and the
sale of the land and ￿nancial assets that had been accumulated during the 80s. Hayashi
and Prescott (2002) also show that small ￿rms, which rely more on bank loans, used cash
and deposits as a bu⁄er to ￿nance their investment.
As argued by Hayashi and Prescott (2002), the slowdown in growth is driven by-an-
large by the slowdown in TFP growth. Figure 2 compares the evolution of TFP in Japan
and the U.S. both detrended at the post-war rate of 1.02% per year. Despite the impressive
performace of US TFP during the 60s, Japan closed a signi￿cant part of the gap with the
1That is de￿ned as persons with ages between 20 and 69 years.
3U.S. Between 1970 and 1990, Japan continued to close the gap while growing faster than
the US long-run average. The 1990s, however, is a di⁄erent story. While US managed to
approximately sustain its long-run TFP growth, Japan￿ s TFP grew signi￿cantly slower
at 0.6% per year.
One interesting question raised by Fukao et al. (2004) concerns whether the slow down
in Japanese TFP growth was driven by the performance of the service or manufacturing
sectors. Figure 3 addresses this issue and shows that manufacturing was the main culprit
for the TFP slow down during the 90s. Figure 4 provides more disaggregated evidence
of the three largest sectors whithin durable manufacturing. These are general machinery,
other electrical machinery and motor vehicles. The slow down in TFP growth in these
three sectors is quite dramatic. ￿ Other electrical machinery￿was the sector with fastest
growing TFP between 1970 and 1990 while, for most of the 1990s, TFP was ￿ at. Motor
vehicles did not experience any TFP growth during the 90s, while in general machinery
the growth rate was negative.
Two of the most signi￿cant sources of TFP growth in developed economies are inno-
vation and technology adoption. Figures 5 and 6 show that Japanese R&D spending also
su⁄ered a signi￿cant slow down after 1990. Figure 7 shows that the growth rate of real
wages in research activities slowdown more than in the rest of the sectors. This suggests
slower demand for scientists and engineers in R&D than in other activities.
Figures 8 and 9 show the di⁄usion of computers and internet in Japan and compares
it to the di⁄usion in the U.S. and in South Korea. Computers and the internet are the
most signi￿cant technologies during the 1990s. Their signi￿cance resides partly in their
generality which makes them important to many activities in many di⁄erent sectors of
the economy. Thus, they provide a good proxy for the overall technology adoption in the
economy.
During the 1990s the gap in computer adoption between Japan and the U.S. increased.
The slow speed of computer adoption in Japan is re￿ ected by the fact that Korea, a sig-
ni￿cantly poorer economy, surpassed Japan in computers per capita. An almost identical
picture emerges from the di⁄usion of the internet.
The question that these ￿ndings beg to ask is why did R&D and the speed of adoption
decline in Japan. It is natural to think that this decline was driven by a decline in
the pro￿tability of the investments to improve technology. But, what drove this lower
4pro￿tability?
A priori, there are many possible answers to this question. One is that aggregate
demand was lower over this period. Aggregate demand can also be driven by a variety
of shocks. Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2007) (GGLS, henceforth) present a variable,
that they call the total mark up, which can be thought as a reduced form of several shocks
which a⁄ect aggregate demand. Speci￿cally, they de￿ne the total markup (or markup,
in short) as the wedge between the marginal product of labor and the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure. To compute this variable it is necessary
to make some parametric assumptions about the utility and production functions. I
assume a Cobb-Douglas production function and a unit elasticity between consumption
and leisure. Of course, demographic and other very slow moving variables may be a⁄ecting
this measure of the markup. So, I ￿lter these using a Band-Pass ￿lter that keeps cycles
with periods between 2 and 100 quarters. Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2007) show that
the markup is highly counter-cyclical at business cycle frequencies. Comin and Gertler
(2006) show that it is highly countercyclical also at the medium term (i.e. ￿ uctuations
associated to cycles with periods between 8 and 50 years). Figure 10 plots the ￿ltered
markup for Japan. In this ￿gure we can see that the Japanese wage markup was high
during the ￿rst half of the 70s and between 1988 and 2000. This is the variable we will
use in section 4 to measure the disturbances in the Japanese economy.
3. The Model
I now develop a model of medium term business ￿ uctuations. The model is annual as
opposed to quarterly because I am interested in capturing ￿ uctuations over a longer
horizon than is typically studied. To this end, I abstract from a number of complicating
factors that would otherwise might be useful for understanding quarterly dynamics, such
as money and nominal rigidities.
The Comin and Gertler (2006) model is a two-sector version of a reasonably conven-
tional real business cycle model, modi￿ed to allow for, among other things, endogenous
productivity and endogenous countercyclical markups. Procyclical entry and exit by ￿-
nal goods ￿rms induces procyclical variation in the degree of competition and, hence,
countercyclical variation in (￿nal goods) price markups, in the spirit of Rotemberg and
5Woodford (1995). The precise formulation we use, though, is based on Gali and Zilibotti
(1995).
Final goods producers use intermediate goods as inputs, along with capital and labor.
As in Romer (1990), creation of new specialized intermediate goods, stemming from R&D
is the source of technological change. As I noted in the introduction, we modify the Romer
framework to allow for an endogenous rate of adoption of new technologies, along with
endogenous R&D. By doing so, I can allow for empirically reasonable di⁄usion lags but still
generate endogenous medium term swings in productivity. Roughly speaking, endogenous
R&D permits disturbances to have permanent e⁄ects on productivity movements, while
endogenous adoption rates accelerate the transition of productivity to the new steady
state. Because the model has two sectors, consumption goods versus capital goods, we
are able to distinguish between embodied and disembodied technological change.
Household￿ s are conventional, except I allow them a bit of market power in labor
supply in order to motivate a wage markup. I then allow for exogenous variation in this
market power This mechanism combined with the entry/exit mechanism in the goods
market permits the model to generate countercyclical movements in both price and wage
markups that are consistent with the data. As I alluded to earlier, this simple structure
is meant as a stand-in for a richer model of markup variation.
3.1. Main Mechanisms
Rather than laying formally the whole model,2 next I just explain in detail the mechanisms
that propagate the wage markup shocks generating large and persistent ￿ uctuations in
productivity and TFP. I do that by explaining the intuition behind the key equilibrium
relationships in the model.
In our model, wage markup shocks, ￿w;t, increase or reduce the wedge between the
wage, Wt; and the marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption, (Lt)￿Ct.
Wt = ￿w;t ￿ (Lt)
￿Ct (1)
2For that, see Comin and Gertler (2006).
6A positive wage markup, reduces, ceteris paribus, the number of hours that the repre-
sentative worker supplies for a given wage rate. This reduction in the number of hours sup-
plied in the market causes a decline in aggregate output. The expectations about future
lower output also drive a decline in aggregate consumption and investment. This reduces
the pro￿ts earned by intermediate goods producers in both the capital and consumption
goods sector, ￿x;t for x = c;k: The value of a company that produces an intermediate
good, Vx;t; is given by the discounted stream of earnings from selling intermediate good:
Vx;t = ￿x;t + R
￿1
t+1￿EtfVx;t+1g (2)
where Rt+1 is the discount rate between t and t+1; and ￿ is the probability the good has
not exogenously disappeared the next period. At times when aggregate demand is lower,
so are current and future pro￿ts and the value of intermediate good producers is also lower.
When intermediate goods are ￿rst invented, they are not yet useable for production. For
that, the inventor must succeed in making the good useable for production (i.e. adopt
it). The more output he invests in adopting the good, the higher the probability he will






t+1￿[Jx;t+1 + ￿(￿x;tHx;t)(Vx;t+1 ￿ Jx;t+1)] (3)
where Hx;t is the amount of output invested in adopting the intermediate good, ￿(:)
(with ￿
0 > 0; and ￿
00 < 0) is the probability the good becomes useable for production next
period, and ￿x;t is a smooth scaling factor which ensures balanced growth. The owners
of an intermediate good that has not been adopted yet, incur in the adoption costs until
they succedd in making the good useable for production. At this point, they obtain a
capital gain because the value of the intermediate good becomes Vx;t+1 which is greater
than Jx;t+1: In recessions, the future value of adopted intermediate goods is lower, and so
is the value of unadopted intermediate goods.
Next, I describe the laws of motion for the total number of intermediate goods in
sector x; Zx;t; and for the number of adopted intermediate goods, Ax;t: The law of motion







￿ + ￿ (4)
where Sx;t is the amount of output spend in R&D activities in sector x; and where ￿x and
￿t are scaling factors: Similarly, the law of motion for the number of adopted intermediate






￿ 1] + ￿ (5)
Intuitively, Zx;t ￿ Ax;t is the stock of unadopted intermediate goods in sector x: A
fraction ￿t of those will be adopted at time t: Given Vx;t and Jx;t and the laws of motion
for Ax;t and Zx;t; the following two equations determine the amount of resources invested
in R&D, Sx;t, and adoption , Hx;t:
(R
￿1




t+1￿[Vx;t+1 ￿ Jx;t+1] = 1 (7)
Equation (6) is a free entry condition that states that the discounted value of new
intermediate goods created by undertaking R&D activities must equal the total cost.
Equation (7) determines the optimal investment in adoption which is the level at which
the marginal cost of investing output in adoption (RHS) equalizes the expected marginal
bene￿t (LHS) which is given by the marginal increase in the probability of successfully
adopting the intermediate good times the capital gain from being adopted (i.e. Vx;t+1 ￿
Jx;t+1).
These two equations illustrate why both R&D and adoption investments are por-
cyclical. When the economy is hit by a positive wage markup shock causing a recession,
the value of not adopted intermediate goods declines. Equation (6) implies that this
will lead to a lower ￿ ow of R&D investments. The value of adopted intermediate goods
declines even more than the value of unadopted interemdiate goods, since the former is
a⁄ected immediately by the current decline in pro￿ts while the latter is a⁄ected only in
the future when the technology is adopted. This decline in Vx;t+1 ￿ Jx;t+1 reduces the
marginal bene￿t from investing in adoption, and from (7) the ￿ ow of output devoted to
adopt new technologies:
8These temporary declines in the investments in improving the existing technology
through R&D and adoption have temporary e⁄ect on the growth rate of technology,
measured by Zx;t and Ax;t; as illustrated by (4) and (5). As a result, the e⁄ects on the
level of technology are permanent. This is the key to understanding the propagation
power of the model.
I conclude this section by linking the growth rate of new technologies with TFP growth.









where ￿x;t is the Solow residual in sector x; and Kx;t and Lx;t denote respectively its capital
and labor. In equilibrium, ￿x;t is given by













There are a few new variables in this expression. ￿x;t is the gross price markup, Nx;t
is the number of ￿nal output producers in sector x; and Ut is the utilization rate. The
capital utilization rate, Ut; enters ￿x;t because it re￿ ects unmeasured intensity of input
usage. The term N
￿x;t￿1
x;t re￿ ects gains from variety due to short run ￿ uctuations in the
number of ￿nal output producers due to entry and exit. The markup ￿x;t also enters ￿x;t
due to the roundabout input-output nature of production. On balance, Ut, N
￿x;t￿1
x;t , and
￿x;t contribute to procyclical variation in ￿x;t, particularly at the high frequencies.
Observe that ￿x;t also increases with Ax;t (since # > 1). We should expect the in￿ uence
of Ax;t on ￿x;t to play out mainly over the medium and low frequencies, since Ax;t is a state
variable that moves smoothly in response to cyclical variations in endogenous investments
in R&D and technology adoption processes.
4. Model Simulations
In this section I explore the ability of the model to generates medium term cycles. I
solve the model by loglinearizing around the deterministic balanced growth path and
then employing the Anderson-Moore code, which provides numerical solutions for general
9￿rst order systems of di⁄erence equations. I use the same calibrated values for the model
parameters as in Comin and Gertler (2006). When calibrating those parameters we make
extensive use of the steady state relationships of the growth model. By using the same
values for Japan and the US, I am implicitly assuming that along the balanced growth
path the variables in both countries grow at the same rate. That seems a reasonable
assumption. It is however di¢ cult to prove given the Japanese experience over the last 50
years. Between 1950 and 1985, Japan dramatically reduced its productivity gap with the
US and quickly converged to approximately 80% of the US per capita income level. Since
1990, however, Japan has grown much slower than the US and the gap between the two has
increased. Neither of these seem to corresponds to the balanced growth path of Japan,
but rather to persistent transitional dynamics which a model like ours should attempt
to explain. Hence, as a ￿rst pass, I ￿nd reasonable the strategy of assuming similar
parameters in the US and Japan and see how far such a model can go in explaining the
Japanese ￿ uctuations.
4.1. Some Numerical Experiments
To be clear, the exercises that follow are meant simply as a ￿rst pass at exploring whether
the mechanisms I emphasize have potential for explaining the data: They are not formal
statistical tests. As in Comin and Gertler (2006), I treat innovations to the wage markup,
￿w
t , stemming from exogenous ￿ uctuations in household labor market power as the main
source of disturbances to the economy. As discussed above, one should keep in mind,
though, that this simple mechanism is meant as a short-cut for a richer description of
countercyclical wage markup behavior.3
Ideally, we would like to evaluate the model against moments of the data that are
conditional on a shock to ￿w
t . There are several di¢ culties with this approach, however.
First, while identi￿ed VAR methods may be useful for measuring the near term e⁄ects of
shocks to the economy, they usually are very imprecise at measuring the kind of medium
term e⁄ects that are the focus of our analysis.4 Second, identi￿cation of orthogonalized
3As discussed in GGLS (2007), a model with either nominal or real wage rigidities can generate a
countercyclical wage markup.
4In particular, long run e⁄ects of impulse response functions from indenti￿ed VARs are measured
much less precisely than are short run e⁄ects.
10movements in ￿w
t is highly problematic, particularly given that in practice there is likely
a strong endogenous component to this variable.
Rather than attempt to match imprecisely estimated conditional moments, we instead
follow the lead of the traditional real business cycle literature by exploring how well a
single shock presumed to be the principle driving force can explain the unconditional
patterns in the data. We view this kind of exercise as a check on the plausibility of the
scenario we o⁄er, as opposed to a clear test against alternatives. While the RBC literature
focused on the ability of technology shocks to account for the high frequency variation in
the data, we instead consider the ability of our model driven by shocks to ￿w
t to explain
the evolution of the Japanese macro variables after removing a linear trend. As a result,
I will try to match not only the high frequency ￿ uctuations in the Japanese data but also
medium term ￿ uctuations.
Impulse response functions
Before confronting the data, we ￿rst gain some intuition for the workings of the model
by examining the model impulse responses to a shock to ￿w
t : In Figure 11, the solid line
in each panel is the response of the respective variable within our model. For comparison
purposes, I also include the responses (dotted lines) generated by a model that is very
similar to the Neoclassical model since it does not have endogenous productivity or en-
dogenous markup variation (though I allow for endogenous factor utilization). The period
length is a year.
The rise in ￿w
t e⁄ectively raises the price of labor, reducing labor demand and output.
Both the initial impact and the impact over time on output is larger in our full blown
model than in the benchmark model. Within the full blown model, the decline in output
leads to a rise in both the consumption and capital goods price markups (due to a decline
in entry within each sector), enhancing the initial drop in output. Over time, output
climbs back to trend, but does not make it back all the way due to the endogenous
permanent decline in productivity, that we describe shortly. After a decade or so it levels
o⁄at a new steady state. The permanent decline in output is about one half of the initial
decline. In the benchmark model without endogenous productivity, output simply reverts
back to its initial steady state.
Even though the shock is not technological, the rise in ￿w
t generates a persistent decline
in TFP and labor productivity and a persistent increase in the relative price of capital.
11The initial decline in measured TFP and labor productivity results mainly from variable
factor utilization (in conjunction with overhead costs) and the rise in the price markups.5
Over time, there is a decline in true productivity relative trend. In particular, the initial
contraction in economic activity induces a drop in both R&D and the rate of technology
adoption.6. The initial decline in R&D slows the rate of creation of new intermediate
products in both the goods and capital sectors, ultimately leading to a permanent drop
relative to trend in total factor productivity and labor productivity. The slowdown in the
adoption rate leads to a near term decline in disembodied productivity growth. Absent
this endogenous slowdown in technology adoption, the decline in productivity following
the drop in R&D would take much longer, assuming realistic di⁄usion lags.
Similarly, variable price markup behavior accounts for the initial rise in the relative
price of capital, while the increase over time is due to a decline in productivity in the
capital goods sector relative to the consumption goods sector. Because investment ini-
tially falls proportionately more than output, the capital goods markup rises relative to
the consumption goods markup, leading to a jump in the relative price of capital. The
disproportionate drop in investment also implies that expected pro￿ts in the capital goods
sector fall relative to the consumption goods sector. As a consequence, there is a relatively
greater drop in both R&D and technology adoption in the capital goods sector, leading
to a slowdown in the creation and adoption of specialized intermediate goods, relative
the consumption goods sector. This leads to a permanent increase in the relative price of
capital.
The (simulated) Japanese slowdown
The ￿nal step in the evaluation of the potential for the model to account for the
Japanese Slowdown is to simulate the time series once the model economy is hit by








; where   is the
fraction of the variety externality in the creation of new capital not captured by the linear aggregation
methodology used by the BEA to compute the capital stock: We calibrate   to 0.31 to match the long
run growth rate of TFP implied by the model to the postwar data. In case the variety externality was
completely mismeasured, annual TFP growth would be 1.72% instead of the actual 1.12%. In addition,
this de￿nition assumes that the BLS measures of TFP do not correct properly for capacity utilization.
6I am assuming that that R&D involves the same factor intensities as goods production. It is thus not
as sensitive to wage behavior as in the Schumpeterian models of Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Aghion
and Saint-Paul (1991). Barlevy (2003) shows that if productivity shocks in the ￿nal goods sector are
su¢ ciently persistent, R&D can be procyclical even in a Schumpeterian model.
12the wage markup shocks observed in the data. As mentioned in Section 2, the markup
increased in japan starting approximately in 1990. It reached a maximum around 1994
and started to decline in 1996. (See Figure 10.)
Figure 12 plots the evolution of GDP implied by the model and compares it to the
actual evolution of GDP in Japan.7 To a ￿rst order, the model seems to predict an
evolution for GDP over the 90s that tracks quite closely the data. In particular, it predicts
that between 1990 and 1995 GDP declines by 11% relative to trend while in the data it
declines by approximately 9.5 %, Then it recovers slightly for the next couple of years
very much like the data. The biggest discrepancy between model and data seem to occur
after 1998, where the model predict a mild recovery of GDP by 2% while in the data it
decline by 2.5%. Overall, however, the two series are quite close and the ￿ uctuations in
GDP induced by the model are both very persistent and large.
Figure 13 reproduces the model predictions and actual data for TFP relative to a linear
trend.8 As with output, the model predictions follow reasonably closely the actual TFP
series for Japan during the 1990s. One could argue that the ￿t of the TFP series in Figure
13 is not surprising in the light of the ￿nding in Hayashi and Prescott (2002) (and the
RBC literature) that once we shock the economy with the observed TFP series, standard
models are able to reproduce output ￿ uctuations. However, the important di⁄erence
is that in our model TFP is completely endogenous, and, as shown in Figure 11, the
persistence of the macro variables (including output and TFP) is much larger than the
persistence of the shocks.
As emphasized above, this endogenous propagation of the model is driven by the
endogenous technology mechanisms. One of these is the development of new technologies
through R&D. Figure 14 compares the evolution of R&D in the model and in the data.
Qualitatively the model follows the data fairly closely. In both detrended (real) R&D
expenditures decline from 1990 until 1995 and then they rebound. It is remarkable then
that the model does not predict more persistent R&D expenditures than what we observe
in the data. However, a feature of the model already pointed out in Comin and Gertler
7Both of these series have been detrended using a linear trend of 2.4 % per year. In the data GDP
has been also divided by the number of people with ages between 20 and 69 years to control for very low
frequency ￿ uctuations driven by demographic factors.
8To be consistent with the calibration, we detrend TFP to the post-war average in the US of 1.12%
per year, as measured by the BLS.
13(2006) is that it generates R&D expenditures that are approximately twice as volatile as
in the data. As a result, R&D declines more during the 90s in the model than it actually
declined in the data.
Next we turn to hours worked. Figure 15 displays the evolution of actual and predicted
hours worked per person between 20 and 69 years old. The model does a fair job in
reproducing the initial decline in hours worked. In the data, the minimum is reached
around 1994 where hours worked is down 4.5%. The model predicts also a minimum
around the same time but the decline is a bit less than 7%. Over the next three years,
hours worked increase in both model and data. In the last two or three years is where
model and data di⁄er the most. In the model hours worked increases by 2.5% relative
to the level in 1998 while in the data it declines until reaching a level 6% lower than in
steady state.
Figure 16 and 17 display the evolution of consumption and investment per working age
population. For both of these variables, the model tracks quite closely the data with the
caveat that the model does not fully capture the declines in these variables over the last
couple of years of the decade. In any case, I think it is fair to say that the model does a
surprisingly good job in explaining the Japanese slowdown during the 90s specially given
that I have calibrated it using the US parameter values and that there are a number of
factors completely missing from the analysis which must play a role. I proceed to discuss
them in the concluding section.
5. Conclusions
Why was the 90s a lost decade for Japan? This paper has argued that though the shocks
that hit the Japanese economy were not so persistent, the investments that Japanese
companies and entrepreneurs did not undertake to improve the technology and the pro-
duction methods during this decade propagated those shocks and made their e⁄ects very
long-lasting. Of course, these propagation mechanisms are not unique to Japan. Indeed,
as shown by Comin and Gertler (2006), these same mechanisms do a very good job in
accounting for the macro ￿ uctuations in the US over the postwar period.
There are several important questions that I have not addressed and which merit
further research. First, and surely most important, what is the exact nature of the
14markup shocks that hit the Japanese economy during the early 90s?
Hayashi and Prescott (2002) identify one important shock in 1987 that introduced
rigidities in the Japanese labor market, the reduction of the maximum number of working
hours allowed per person. However, more work is needed to explore whether there were
other distortionary government interventions in labor markets afterwards. As argued in
Hall (1997) and GGLS (2007), among others, there are many shocks that are isomorphic
to our wage markup shocks. Frictions in the labor markets, labor income taxes, shocks to
the entry costs, changes in competition policies, even monetary policy in the presence of
nominal rigidities all those can be expressed in a way whose reduced form collapses to our
wage markup shocks. Further, ￿nancial frictions are isomorphic to shocks to the relative
price of capital which, as shown by Comin, Gertler and Santacreu (2008) in a framework
similar to the one used in this paper, have similar e⁄ects in macro variables to our wage
markup shocks once endogenous technology adoption is introduced in the model.
To some extent, it is surprising how well the model ￿ts the Japanses experience over
the 90s given how many mechanisms, which a priori seem relevant, I have left out of the
model. It would be easy to argue that this list should contain, a least, credit market
imperfections and the international economy. Credit imperfections may amplify business
cycles through balance sheet e⁄ects which make harder for ￿rms to borrow in recessions. It
is not so clear, though, how they can propagate shocks. Further even their ampli￿cation
e⁄ect might be questioned in the light of the ￿ndings in Hayashi and Prescott (2002).
Exchange rate ￿ uctuations, instead, may easily propagate certain shocks since the decline
in aggregate demand in Japan led to an apreciation of the Yen that further reduced the
demand for Japanese exports. I plan on exploring in future work, how these mechanisms
interact with the mechanisms presented in this paper.
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Figure 17: Investment (1990 = 100)
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